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ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court held in 1985 that agency refusals to
enforce are presumptively unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure
Act. In doing so, the Court created an exception for when an agency has
“consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Courts and scholars
have mostly interpreted this abdication exception as capturing only total
nonenforcement, which is when an agency completely stops enforcing its
statutory responsibilities. On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit allows review
of all general enforcement policies, regardless of whether they implicate
abdication—but rarely do agencies create such official policies. Both these
approaches, however, fail to allow review when the agency is underenforcing
its responsibilities so severely that it achieves substantially the same effect
as total nonenforcement.
This type of “severe underenforcement” poses concerning problems. It
can potentially undermine complex statutory schemes and implicates
constitutional separation of powers concerns. This Note argues that courts
and scholars have misread the abdication exception to include only total
nonenforcement. Because severe underenforcement poses the same types of
concerns that compelled the Court to establish the abdication exception,
courts should also allow review under the Administrative Procedure Act
when there is severe underenforcement. Adopting a severe
underenforcement approach to the abdication exception would help alleviate
the concerns it poses and check agency overreach via underenforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
Sixty-seven: the number of endangered Mexican wolves that had been
killed illegally from their reintroduction into the American Southwest in
1998 through 2015.1 Fourteen: the number of Mexican wolves that were
killed in 2016 alone—the highest number in a single year.2 Two: the total
number of killings that have been prosecuted.3 This high number of killings,
many of which are classified as potentially illegal,4 presents an opportunity
for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate and prosecute suspected
individuals under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). But the DOJ has
underenforced the ESA by requiring prosecutors to request jury instructions
that set the mens rea as specific intent; to satisfy that, prosecutors must show
1
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MEXICAN WOLF RECOVERY PROGRAM: PROGRESS REPORT #18, at
33 (2015). There were fourteen new deaths in 2016, all of which were still under investigation, but some
were believed to be illegal killings. Susan Montoya Bryan, Feds: 14 Endangered Mexican Wolves Found
Dead in 2016, AZCENTRAL (published Jan. 4, 2017, 12:16 PM, updated Jan. 4, 2017, 2:42 PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-science/2017/01/04/feds-14-endangered-mexicanwolves-found-dead-2016/96161412 [https://perma.cc/2MLF-3UK2]. This is out of a current population
of around 113. See News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2016 Mexican Wolf Population Survey
Reveals Gains for Experimental Population 1 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/
mexicanwolf/pdf/NR_2016_Mexican_Wolf_Annual_Count.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW8R-5HQW]. Over
half of Mexican wolf killings are thus estimated to have been illegal mortalities. Larisa E. Harding et al.,
Genetic Management and Setting Recovery Goals for Mexican Wolves (Canis Lupus Baileyi) in the Wild,
203 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 151, 157 (2016).
2
Bryan, supra note 1.
3
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 67, WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 181 F. Supp. 3d 651 (D. Ariz. 2015) (No. 4:13-cv-00392).
4
See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 1.

1172

112:1171 (2018)

Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication

that the defendant knew he was shooting an endangered animal.5 Because the
eventual mens rea prosecutors must prove at trial impacts which cases to
investigate and prosecute, the difficulty of proving this mens rea beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial has resulted in fewer prosecutions.6 As the policy
only rarely results in enforcement, it undermines the deterrent effect of the
ESA’s criminal prohibition on the killing of endangered species.7 Yet this
prohibition is one of the statute’s main ways of protecting endangered
species, and the DOJ’s adoption of this policy cannot easily be squared with
Congress’s intent in enacting the ESA.8
Beyond this policy, executive underenforcement has proliferated in the
last few decades, including under Presidents Ronald Reagan,9 George H.W.
Bush,10 and George W. Bush.11 More recently, President Barack Obama used
underenforcement as a tool to achieve policy directives when faced with a
recalcitrant Congress. For instance, the DOJ deprioritized prosecution of
certain federal marijuana offenses,12 the Department of Health and Human
5
See Ed Newcomer et al., The Endangered Species Act v. the United States Department of Justice:
How the Department of Justice Derailed Criminal Prosecutions Under the Endangered Species Act,
17 ANIMAL L. 251, 266–67 (2011).
6
See id. at 270 (describing DOJ prosecutors as “hobbled” by the higher mens rea requirement).
7
See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012) (prohibition on taking); see also Newcomer et al., supra note
5, at 269–70 (arguing that charges under the ESA were “appropriate” for a hunter accused of killing an
endangered bird, but noting that the hunter escaped penalties due to the mens rea requirement).
8
Cf. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978) (“[E]xamination of the language, history,
and structure of the [ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be
afforded the highest of priorities.”).
9
See Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1125–30 (2015)
[hereinafter Price, Politics]. For example, from 1980 to 1982, penalties assessed by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration fell 27%, while prosecutions under a key environmental statute fell
from forty-three to three prosecutions. BARRY D. FRIEDMAN, REGULATION IN THE REAGAN–BUSH ERA
84 (1995).
10
See Price, Politics, supra note 9, at 1130; Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to
be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce
the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2003).
11
See Price, supra note 9 at 1130–33.
12
See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S.
Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crimes 2–3 (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/banks/dept-of-justice-memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J7Y7-VJP8];
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. Attorneys,
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 2–3 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VKB-8QQG]; Memorandum from James
M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden
Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use 1–2 (June 29, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medicalmarijuana-use.pdf [https://perma.cc/26FK-WN9X]; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Selected U.S. Attorneys, Investigations and Prosecutions in
States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana 1–2 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2ZY-7ELL].
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Services postponed deadlines for key provisions of the Affordable Care
Act,13 and the Department of Homeland Security implemented deferred
action programs that relied upon underenforcement of existing immigration
laws.14
Legal challenges to agency initiatives have had mixed success.15 This is
partially due to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal courts’
power to review certain aspects of agency decisionmaking. The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),16 which establishes the general scope
of judicial review for administrative agency action, allows for review of final
agency action or inaction.17 In Heckler v. Chaney, however, the Court
interpreted the APA to give an agency’s decision not to enforce a potential
civil or criminal violation a presumption of unreviewability.18 The Court also
provided ways to rebut that presumption of unreviewability, one of which
requires showing that the agency has “‘consciously and expressly adopted a
general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its
statutory responsibilities.”19

13
See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 8569–
76 (Feb. 12, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116; Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for
Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to State Ins. Comm’rs (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/
Resources/Letters/Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RKQ3-9WJN];
Bulletin from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Extension of Transitional
Policy Through October 1, 2016 (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulationsand-Guidance/Downloads/transition-to-compliant-policies-03-06-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UZ948K78].
14
See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., for David Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KYJ-J485] (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)); see also Memorandum
from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., for León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals
Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents
of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JPZ-JJLN] (extending this policy
to undocumented immigrants who are legal residents or parents of U.S. citizens).
15
Compare Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134,
146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct.
285 (2016) (reviewing and enjoining deferred action immigration programs), with West v. Holder, 60 F.
Supp. 3d 197, 203–04 (D.D.C. 2015) (refusing to review and enjoin marijuana deprioritization policy
because it fell under the President’s enforcement discretion).
16
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2012).
17
Id. §§ 702, 706. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision narrowly. See Norton v. S. Utah
Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (“Thus, a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff
asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”).
18
470 U.S. 821, 827–35 (1985).
19
Id. at 833 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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This Note explores both how courts and scholars have interpreted and
should interpret this exception for agency abdication. There are two main
ways of construing the Chaney abdication exception’s scope: (1) the
abdication exception applies only when there is complete or total
nonenforcement or (2) the abdication exception applies if there is either
complete nonenforcement or severe underenforcement. This Note defines
severe underenforcement as underenforcement so severe that it reaches the
same practical result as total nonenforcement, such as when a provision is
enforced only twice per year when many more opportunities to enforce it
existed.20 There is also a third approach to all agency enforcement taken by
the D.C. Circuit, which, instead of focusing on the abdication language,
allows review when an agency has adopted a general enforcement policy.
To understand these three approaches, consider three examples. First,
suppose that the Department of Homeland Security did not investigate or
deport any illegal aliens for a year. The total nonenforcement and severe
underenforcement approaches would likely allow judicial review in this
situation. But under the general policy approach, the agency’s choice not to
enforce would likely not be reviewable unless the agency adopted a general
enforcement policy.
Second, suppose that the Department of Homeland Security went from
deporting tens of thousands of illegal aliens in one year to deporting fifty the
next year without any change in the substantive law. Under the total
nonenforcement approach, a court would likely refuse to review the agency’s
choice not to enforce because the agency is still minimally enforcing the
statute. Under the severe underenforcement approach, challengers could
probably rebut Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability. A court using the
general policy approach would find the presumption intact unless the agency
adopted a general policy.
Third, suppose that the Department of Homeland Security adopted a
policy that it was categorically not going to deport illegal aliens who fit
certain criteria. If the agency consequently did not deport those illegal aliens
but deported others, a court following the total nonenforcement approach
still might not review the policy. But if the deportation numbers were
sufficiently low, the severe underenforcement approach may allow review
of the agency’s decisions not to enforce. In either case, a court could review
the policy under the general policy approach.
Ultimately, the best interpretation of abdication for the purposes of
rebutting the presumption of unreviewability is the severe underenforcement
20
This definition introduces some discretion, which poses the question of whether courts can—or
should—easily make this threshold determination of whether there is severe underenforcement. But see
infra Section IV.C (addressing this concern).
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approach, which allows review of both total nonenforcement and severe
underenforcement. The Court established the abdication exception to ensure
that agencies could not refuse to enforce statutory prohibitions. Because
severe underenforcement can achieve substantially the same effect, courts
should interpret abdication to include severe underenforcement and thus
allow judicial review under those circumstances.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes Heckler v. Chaney and
the establishment of the abdication exception. Then Part II outlines the total
nonenforcement approach that most courts and scholars have taken. It also
explains how they have misinterpreted Chaney to dictate that abdication only
includes nonenforcement. Next, Part III explains and analyzes the general
policy approach that some courts, primarily the D.C. Circuit, have adopted.
Lastly, Part IV discusses how a few courts have used the severe
underenforcement approach to find Chaney’s presumption rebutted. It then
delineates how the phenomenon of severe underenforcement poses pressing
problems in two different contexts. First, it examines environmental law as
an example of how severe underenforcement harms complex statutory
schemes in which civil and criminal penalties are overlapping and in which
there is heavy dependence on federal enforcement. Second, it describes the
constitutional concerns that severe underenforcement introduces, including
potential violations of the Presentment Clause and the Take Care Clause.
Part IV concludes by arguing that courts should interpret abdication more
broadly to encompass severe underenforcement and explores how to do so
in a principled way.
I.

HECKLER V. CHANEY AND REVIEWABLE ABDICATION

The Supreme Court has interpreted the APA to establish a presumption
of unreviewability for agency decisions not to enforce. The APA allows a
person who suffered from an agency’s legal wrong or who is aggrieved by
agency action to judicially challenge that agency’s final action or inaction.21
The language of § 706 suggests that the reviewing court has broad authority
to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”22 or
to set aside agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of
discretion.”23 This originally led to a general presumption of reviewability

21
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012) (action); id. § 551(13) (inaction); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 160–61 (1996) (explaining judicial review under the
APA before and after Chaney).
22
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
23
Id. § 706(1)(A).
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under the APA.24 Section 701(a)(2), however, creates an exception to this
presumption to the extent that the “agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law.”25
The Court’s most recent interpretation of § 701(a)(2) came in the 1985
case of Heckler v. Chaney.26 In Chaney, death row inmates petitioned the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforcement action under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, alleging that states’ use of lethal
injection violated that statute.27 The FDA denied the petition and the inmates
challenged that denial.28 On appeal, the Court held that agency decisions to
refuse enforcement were presumptively unreviewable based on three
rationales.29 First, agency decisions not to enforce involve balancing
numerous factors within the agency’s expertise, and the agency—rather than
courts—should decide how to best allocate resources.30 Second, “when an
agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over
an individual’s liberty or property rights.”31 Lastly, the Court noted the
similarities between prosecutorial discretion and agency discretion, stating
that agencies, like prosecutors, should be free to decide when not to pursue
enforcement actions.32
24
See, e.g., Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015) (“[T]his Court applies a
strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
25
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). The Supreme Court’s first full discussion of § 701(a)(2) came in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The Court found that § 701(a)(2)
presented a narrow exception to the general presumption of unreviewability when there was “no law to
apply,” meaning when a reviewing court had no meaningful standards against which to measure agency
action. See id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26). This decision only muddied the waters: how to
determine when there was “no law to apply” was unclear. See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding
Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 707–10 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein,
Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 659 (1985). Courts
consequently split over how to determine whether there was law to apply. See Levin, supra, at 710–11.
For instance, some courts applied the Overton Park test to foreclose judicial review when the statute gave
no substantive guidance, even if it may have been an abuse of discretion under the APA, while other
courts reverted to pre-Overton Park tests. See id. at 710.
26
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
27
Id. at 823.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 831–32.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 832.
32
Id. (noting that both are left to the discretion of the President via his power under the Take Care
Clause); see also Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671,
748 (2014) [hereinafter Price, Enforcement Discretion] (discussing the connections between
administrative discretion and prosecutorial discretion). As hinted at by the Court, prosecutors have
extensive prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o
long as the prosecutor has probable cause . . . , the decision whether or not to prosecute . . . generally rests
entirely in his discretion.”).
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According to the Chaney Court, challengers can potentially rebut this
presumption of unreviewability by showing that “the agency has
‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities,”33 which this Note
refers to as the “abdication exception.” Chaney was not one of those
situations,34 but the Court cited favorably to a D.C. Circuit case, Adams v.
Richardson.35 In Adams, the challengers alleged that the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) failed to enforce Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act by continuing to fund segregated institutions rather than
following the relevant enforcement methods laid out in the statute.36 HEW
argued that nonenforcement decisions were committed to agency discretion
and therefore were not judicially reviewable.37 The D.C. Circuit, however,
refused to apply § 701(a)(2)’s narrow exception to the APA’s presumption
of reviewability.38 Instead, the court distinguished the case on the basis that
HEW had “consciously and expressly adopted a general policy which [wa]s
in effect an abdication of its statutory duty”39—language later quoted in
Chaney.40
Other than this footnote reference to Adams, the Chaney Court offered
no guidance on what the abdication exception entails or how courts can
determine whether abdication is occurring.41 Consequently, courts have
33
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(en banc) (per curiam)). The Court also provided other ways of rebutting the presumption of
unreviewability that are not the subject of this Note. Id. at 832–33; see also Sunstein, supra note 25, at
675–83 (discussing six potential arguments to rebut the presumption of unreviewability). For example,
challengers can overcome the presumption of unreviewability by pointing to judicially manageable
standards against which the agency nonenforcement can be judged. See, e.g., Chong v. Dir., U.S. Info.
Agency, 821 F.2d 171, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1987); Giacobbi v. Biermann, 780 F. Supp. 33, 36–38 (D.D.C.
1992).
34
470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
35
480 F.2d 1159.
36
Id. at 1161–63.
37
Id. at 1161.
38
Id. at 1161–62.
39
Id. at 1162; see also id. at 1163 (“A consistent failure to [enforce Title VI by one of the two
statutory means] is a dereliction of duty reviewable in the courts.”).
40
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).
41
The Court recently missed an opportunity to clarify the doctrine in Texas v. United States, in which
Texas and other states challenged the Department of Homeland Security’s nonenforcement of
immigration directives under the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (DAPA) program. The state used the concept of abdication in two ways: (1) to bolster its
argument that it had standing (“abdication standing”) and (2) to argue that the agency’s refusal to enforce
was reviewable. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 636–43, 662–63 (S.D. Tex. 2015). The
district court held both that Texas had standing and that DAPA constituted complete abdication
warranting judicial review of the agency’s nonenforcement. See id. at 643. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015). But see id. at 200–01 (King, J., dissenting)
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differed in how they interpret what amounts to reviewable abdication. As
Part II describes, most courts and scholars have interpreted abdication to
indicate only complete nonenforcement. A few courts, including the D.C.
Circuit, require a general enforcement policy before reviewing an agency’s
nonenforcement decision, as discussed in Part III. Lastly, Part IV details how
a handful of courts have used a severe underenforcement approach.
II. NONENFORCEMENT AS ABDICATION
In an attempt to rebut Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability of
refusals to enforce, litigants have argued that agencies have abdicated their
statutory responsibilities. In response, most courts have adopted a total
nonenforcement approach to abdication and rejected these arguments using
three interrelated rationales. Moreover, scholars have similarly interpreted
the abdication exception as capturing only total nonenforcement. Both the
courts and scholars, however, have misread Chaney.
A. In the Courts
Generally, courts have legitimized the abdication exception’s potential
to rebut Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability42 but have refused to find
it applicable in most cases.43 Their reasoning in doing so falls into three
overlapping and interrelated categories: (1) the agency is still at least
minimally enforcing the statute, (2) the agency has not announced a general
policy of nonenforcement, and (3) the agency has complete discretion
because there are no relevant statutory guidelines. Courts often use a mix of
the above rationales. Each rationale demonstrates that most courts have
(arguing that it was not clear that the agency was doing nothing to enforce the federal immigration laws).
The Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided vote and denied rehearing. United States v. Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016) (mem.).
42
See, e.g., Mont. Air Chapter No. 29, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, v. FLRA, 898 F.2d 753, 756
(9th Cir. 1990). But in two cases, courts have focused on the specific language of Chaney, as the Court
stated that it “express[ed] no opinion on whether such [abdication] decisions would be unreviewable,”
470 U.S. at 833 n.4, in rejecting the abdication exception. See Hi-Tech Bed Sys. Corp. v. U.S. Gen. Servs.
Admin., No. 11-CV-293-S, 2012 WL 12871622, at *6 (D. Wyo. Mar. 8, 2012); Am. Disabled for
Attendant Programs Today v. HUD, No. CIV. A. 96-5881, 1998 WL 113802, at *3 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
12, 1998), aff’d, 170 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 1999).
43
See, e.g., California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997). A few courts have
ultimately found that agency nonenforcement is reviewable under similar reasoning as the total
nonenforcement approach but have failed to cite the abdication exception. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv.
Co. v. FERC, 782 F.2d 730, 745 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he Commission can[not] essentially abandon its
regulatory function of ensuring just, reasonable, and preferential rates to Natural under the guise of
unreviewable agency inaction.”); Jones v. Comptroller of the Currency, 983 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.D.C.
1997) (“Judicial review is available under the APA, however, with respect to plaintiff’s allegation that
the OCC has failed generally and programmatically to fulfill the mandate of [the statute].”), aff’d, No.
97-5341, 1998 WL 315581 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 1998) (per curiam).
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interpreted the abdication exception to implicate only nonenforcement and
not severe underenforcement.
For instance, in Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins,44 the Second Circuit relied
on the first rationale. Riverkeeper requested that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) take certain actions regarding two nuclear power plants,
fearing potential terrorist attacks.45 The agency refused to take action.46
Subsequently, the court rejected Riverkeeper’s contention that the abdication
exception applied.47 The court reasoned that, although the agency refused
Riverkeeper’s specific requests,48 the NRC had otherwise acted to fulfill its
general statutory duty of adequately protecting public health and safety.49
Moreover, the court incorporated aspects of the second rationale in its
reasoning because it was not willing to find an express “NRC policy not to
consider potential terrorist attacks by airborne vehicles” based on preSeptember 11 documents.50 Because that did not amount to a policy, the
Second Circuit found that there was no “NRC policy expressly abdicating
any relevant statutory responsibility.”51
As in Riverkeeper, courts have commonly employed the second
rationale to find that the agency has not adopted a general policy of
nonenforcement, and it thus did not completely abdicate its duties. Courts
usually refuse to read a general nonenforcement policy into a few
occurrences of nonenforcement or unofficial agency representations,
including documents.52 This is especially true when the agency itself
disclaims having a general nonenforcement policy. In People for the Ethical

44

359 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 158.
46
Id. at 163.
47
Id. at 166–71.
48
Id. at 169.
49
Id. at 168. The court further noted that finding abdication every time the agency “decline[d] to
order demanded action” would undermine Chaney. See id. at 169 (“[I]n thus shutting the front door to
federal courts, [the Court] did not mean to open a back door . . . . Such an exception to the rule that failure
to institute an enforcement action is generally not reviewable would threaten to devour the rule.”).
For examples of other courts using this first rationale, see, e.g., Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1084
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1412 (10th Cir. 1990); Mass. Pub. Interest
Research Grp., Inc. v. NRC, 852 F.2d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 1988); Gillis v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
759 F.2d 565, 578–79 (6th Cir. 1985).
50
Riverkeeper, 359 F.3d at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51
Id. at 166.
52
Unofficial agency documents are perhaps those that do not have the force of law and do not receive
Chevron deference, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (finding that classification
rulings, along with “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines,” are “beyond the Chevron pale”) (internal quotation marks omitted), although the courts are
imprecise in describing what makes a document unofficial in this context.
45
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Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,53 for example, the
District Court for the District of Columbia refused to infer a general policy
of nonenforcement from the agency officials’ decade-long repeated
assertions that avian abuse did not fall within their jurisdiction under the
Animal Welfare Act (AWA).54 The court instead looked to the agency’s
promulgated rules and regulations, which it found evinced intent to enforce
the AWA as to birds.55 Similarly, in NAACP v. Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development,56 the First Circuit found that several individual grant
denials did not rise to the level of a general policy or practice. 57 Like in
Riverkeeper, courts sometimes treat the first rationale of partial enforcement
as a subset of the second: by even infrequently enforcing the statutory or
regulatory duties, the agency demonstrated that it had not adopted a general
nonenforcement policy.58
Moreover, as a vague catchall, courts in several different circumstances
have found that the agency maintains complete discretion and, thus, any
efforts at enforcement not precluded by the statute foreclose the use of the
abdication exception.59 For some courts, this third rationale is especially
conclusory.60 Other courts reason that if there are no specific duties in the
statute that can be used to judge the action, there are no statutory
responsibilities to abdicate.61 In doing so, courts have consistently noted the

53

7 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (mem.).
Id. at 12.
55
Id. D.C. Circuit cases have sometimes used this rationale when specifically addressing the
abdication exception, rather than just using the general enforcement policy approach detailed in Part III.
See, e.g., Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, v. FLRA, 283 F.3d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
agency’s two rulings about responsibilities were not enough to show a policy of nonenforcement severe
enough to trigger the abdication exception).
56
817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987).
57
See id. at 159.
58
See, e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the court
could find abdication “only if [the NRC] has established a policy not to protect . . . public health and
safety,” and foreclosing such a finding by listing the various measures the NRC took to that end).
59
See, e.g., Garcia v. McCarthy, 649 F. App’x 589, 592 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that the abdication
exception did not apply to EPA’s delay in implementing regulation but instead that “this case centers . . .
around EPA’s interpretation of its own enforcement duties under Title VI, a matter committed to its
discretion by law”); Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 500–01 (D. Conn. 2006) (“[This]
policy disagreement can hardly be labeled an abdication of the Secretary’s responsibilities.”).
60
See, e.g., California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he allegations
asserted in the instant Complaint do not rise to a level that would indicate such an abdication.”).
61
See Va. Beach Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. Reich, 881 F. Supp. 1059, 1072 (E.D. Va. 1995);
Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334, 1340–41 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir.
1995). Some courts have gotten around this by applying the abdication exception to regulatory or other
responsibilities. See infra notes 150, 168 and accompanying text.
54
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sentiment that “[r]eal or perceived inadequate enforcement of . . . laws does
not constitute a reviewable abdication of duty.”62
Each of these three rationales stem from these courts’ conceptualization
of the abdication exception as encompassing only total agency
nonenforcement. In other words, reasoning that any enforcement action
disqualifies challengers from using the abdication exception because there is
minimal enforcement signifies that courts view the abdication exception as
only applying when there is no enforcement at all. For this large majority of
courts, underenforcement—no matter how severe—does not fall within the
reach of the abdication exception.
Likewise, as in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, courts’
practice of refusing to infer adoption of a general policy from repeated
agency representations or refusals to enforce effectively requires agencies to
completely stop enforcing the relevant provisions to satisfy the abdication
exception. Only then can a court easily discern a general policy amounting
to abdication. This might include absolutely no enforcement of the statutory
provisions or the adoption of a general nonenforcement policy. Neither
possibility captures severe underenforcement.
Lastly, the widespread adoption of the complete nonenforcement
approach is reflected by decisions that suggest the agency retains
enforcement discretion when there are no clear responsibilities. As with
weak enforcement, if the agency exercises that discretion, a court cannot
review its refusals to enforce. Requiring specific statutory responsibilities
that the agency is ignoring or bypassing is more likely to capture total
nonenforcement than severe underenforcement. These courts do not even
examine whether there is underenforcement more generally. Therefore, no
matter the rationale, most courts have been interpreting abdication to mean
only complete nonenforcement.
B. In the Literature
In addition to courts, scholars have interpreted Chaney’s abdication
exception as implicating only total nonenforcement. For instance, Daniel
Deacon described the abdication exception as the Chaney exception “with
perhaps the most limited reach.”63 Deacon noted that “the exception has
remained quite limited” because the exception seems to require that agencies
“abandon[] enforcement in an entire area,” which they will rarely do.64

62

Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997).
Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 804
(2010).
64
Id. (emphasis added).
63
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Essentially, Deacon describes the abdication exception as requiring an
agency to stop enforcing statutory provisions completely.
Deacon is not alone. For instance, Professor Cass Sunstein, writing not
long after the Court decided Chaney, found that an agency announcing that
it will no longer enforce a statute satisfies the abdication exception because
that agency action is “contrary to the will of the legislature that enacted the
statute.”65 But Sunstein argued that an agency’s “isolated failure[s] to act” do
not lead to the same conclusion.66 Moreover, according to Sunstein, refusal
to act in a large number of cases may not be enough to form the pattern of
nonenforcement contemplated by the abdication exception.67 While Sunstein
seemed to consider that courts could perhaps infer a pattern of
nonenforcement by comparing the number of cases in which the agency
refused to enforce against the total statutory jurisdiction of the agency,68 he
concluded that it was ultimately too difficult to tell “whether a particular case
falls in the category of ‘abdication’ or of isolated refusal to act.”69 In a later
work, Sunstein and Professor Adrian Vermeule examined the abdication
exception in the context of a temporary moratorium on enforcing
discretionary duties and found that a temporary abandonment of those duties
did not satisfy the abdication exception—more was needed.70 In other words,
complete nonenforcement was needed.
Two other scholars went so far as to locate the total nonenforcement
requirement in the Court’s reasoning in Chaney. Donald Levy and Debra
Duncan noted that inherent in Chaney’s reasoning was the assertion that an

65

Sunstein, supra note 25, at 678.
Id. at 678–79.
67
Id. at 679. Other scholars have made similar observations. See, e.g., Bradley E. Markano, Enabling
State Deregulation of Marijuana Through Executive Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289,
305–06 (2015) (finding that the abdication exception does not apply when there is a “simple and
nonmandatory shift in the priorities of federal prosecutors”).
68
Sunstein, supra note 25, at 679.
69
Id.
70
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies Defer Decisions,
103 GEO. L.J. 157, 193 (2014); cf. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully
Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 235–36 (2015) (“[T]he decision to defer deportations
by itself is not enough to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Sunstein and Vermeule ultimately argued for an anti-abdication principle, like that
established in Chaney, that applies to all agency action, not just enforcement. See Sunstein & Vermeule,
supra, at 185–89. According to them, agency inaction poses serious separation of powers concerns. See
id. at 186 (“Suppose that a statute gives the agency discretion to make decisions whether to decide, and
that the agency offers valid reasons—related to resource allocation and priority setting—for deferring the
relevant decisions. Suppose also, however, that the agency repeatedly gives those same reasons,
constantly moving the decision to the back of the queue. Over time, the consequence will be that the
statutory scheme is effectively nullified, in practice if not openly.”); see also infra Section IV.B.2
(discussing similar concerns).
66
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agency’s decision not to enforce “cannot be arbitrary or capricious unless it
amounts to a complete abdication of the agency’s statutory obligations.”71
While they viewed abdication as encompassing total nonenforcement, they
ultimately disagreed with the Court’s reasoning and decision to establish the
presumption of unreviewability in the first place.72 Daniel Stepanicich
similarly noted that enforcement actions that fall short of a policy of ignoring
a statutory mandate but are more than a one-shot decision do not qualify for
the abdication exception.73 Based on this understanding that the abdication
exception requires total nonenforcement, several scholars have determined
that it will rarely be effective in rebutting Chaney’s presumption of
unreviewability.74
Professor Zachary Price engaged in a more nuanced analysis of what
the abdication exception entails.75 Price identified the essential problem with
abdication as one of “unmanageable line-drawing.”76 He argued that
nonenforcement falls along a spectrum and it is unclear how much abdication
Chaney prohibits.77 Furthermore, he accepted that agencies will never be able
to enforce every statute fully due to lack of resources and natural
prioritization, such as prioritizing more serious crimes.78 Price ultimately
rejected the utility of the abdication exception and argued instead for a
political question approach to issues of nonenforcement and
underenforcement.79 In doing so, Price ultimately accepted the complete

71
Donald M. Levy, Jr., & Debra Jean Duncan, Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking and
Enforcement Discretion: The Effect of a Presumption of Unreviewability, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596,
627 n.214 (1987).
72
See id. (noting that an agency’s rescission of one of its regulations is reviewable even though this
does not amount to abdication and suggesting that a similar standard should govern nonenforcement).
73
Daniel Stepanicich, Comment, Presidential Inaction and the Constitutional Basis for Executive
Nonenforcement Discretion, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1507, 1534 (2016).
74
See, e.g., Deacon, supra note 63, at 804 (“[P]laintiffs alleging a pattern of agency inaction will
have a hard time proving that the pattern amounts to a conscious and express abdication of an agency’s
statutory responsibility.”).
75
See Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571,
1615–16 (2016) [hereinafter Price, Law Enforcement].
76
Id. at 1616. This is similar to the position that Sunstein and Vermeule took when they stated that
the abdication exception is “admittedly vague and not easily subject to judicial administration.” Sunstein
& Vermeule, supra note 70, at 162.
77
Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 75, at 1616.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1617 (“[Chaney]’s abdication principle will rarely provide a principled way out of the
problem of judicial unmanageability with respect to nonenforcement.”). The political question doctrine
recognizes “that some legal obligations defy judicial enforcement,” and in those situations the issue is
essentially nonjusticiable. Id. at 1587. The Supreme Court has outlined a six-factor test that governs the
identification of political questions. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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nonenforcement interpretation of abdication as correct and rejected the
severe underenforcement interpretation.80
These pieces reflect the general sentiment in the literature that the
abdication exception contemplates only total nonenforcement and not severe
underenforcement, even as scholars have recognized that extreme
underenforcement may present the same concerns.81
C. Misreading Chaney
Courts and scholars have been misreading Chaney to apply the
abdication exception only in cases of total nonenforcement. The Court in
Chaney did not, however, mean to preclude review when there is severe
underenforcement. Reading the case otherwise ignores both the text
establishing the exception and the Court’s intent, as demonstrated by its
reference to Adams.
First, the text in which the abdication exception has its roots discusses
“a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has
consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”82 This language
does not limit the interpretation to include only complete nonenforcement.
The phrase “a general policy that is so extreme” could include any extreme
policy, whether total nonenforcement or severe underenforcement.
Additionally, the adverbs “consciously” and “expressly” seem to signal that
the agency’s intention and method in adopting this policy are important. This
principle also applies to severe underenforcement because agencies can
consciously and expressly choose to dramatically underenforce statutes.
Additionally, the word “abdication” is defined as “to relinquish” or “to cast
off” something, such as a responsibility.83 Under these definitions, severe
underenforcement can amount to abdication. The text establishing the
abdication exception thus does not explicitly require total enforcement.
Second, the Chaney Court cited to Adams, which demonstrated its
underlying intent.84 In Adams, the D.C. Circuit specifically noted that the suit
was not challenging nonenforcement in a few school districts but rather

80

Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 75, at 1617.
See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73, 110
(2015) (noting that deprioritizing certain enforcement actions “can have a very similar effect to
categorical nonenforcement”).
82
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83
Abdicate,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abdicate
[https://perma.cc/B3C8-6X6Z].
84
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (per curiam)).
81
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challenging essentially complete nonenforcement.85 In that way, Adams
seems to suggest that the abdication exception should at least extend to total
nonenforcement. At the same time, the court distinguished the situation in
Adams from one in which there is a “generally effective enforcement
program.”86 An enforcement program with severe underenforcement is
unlikely to be generally effective because the statute is not being consistently
enforced. The reference to Adams therefore also supports the proposition that
the Court did not necessarily intend the abdication exception to include only
total nonenforcement.
Analyzing Chaney demonstrates that the abdication exception can
plausibly include more than total nonenforcement. The Court appeared
worried about agencies purposefully undermining statutes, which severe
underenforcement also does. In addition, the Chaney Court was concerned
about abdication in situations where there is no generally effective
enforcement program. Purposeful, severe underenforcement is the opposite
of that. Thus, courts and scholars have been misunderstanding Chaney’s
abdication exception to preclude severe underenforcement when reviewing
severe underenforcement might best address the Court’s concerns.
III. GENERAL ENFORCEMENT POLICIES
In addition to taking a total nonenforcement approach to the abdication
exception,87 the D.C. Circuit has its own approach that exempts all general
enforcement policies from Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability. Under
this approach, courts can review general, official enforcement policies, just
not single nonenforcement decisions.88 Ultimately, this approach might be
too formalistic and strict. It creates perverse incentives for agencies to not
85
See Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162. In fact, based on the statute at issue in the case, some have argued
that Chaney’s footnote reference to Adams is unilluminating because Adams is a pre-Chaney decision
with potentially dubious precedential value. See Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 75, at 1616–17
(discussing Adams and arguing it may have been the perfect, but anomalous, case for the abdication
exception); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 60 F. Supp. 3d
14, 18 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that Adams “ha[d] limited relevance for understanding the scope of”
Chaney).
86
Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162.
87
See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1035–36 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting
the argument that the EPA’s nonenforcement decision fell within the abdication exception because the
EPA was enforcing the statute in other ways).
88
See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993); cf. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n
v. EPA, 980 F.2d 765, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that the presumption of unreviewability was
“inapplicable or at least rebutted” in part because the National Wildlife Federation was challenging an
interpretation of the statute rather than a “particular enforcement decision”); Int’l Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Even if
a statutory interpretation is announced in the course of a nonenforcement decision, that does not mean
that it escapes review altogether.”).
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adopt any enforcement policies and therefore creates potential for total
nonenforcement and severe underenforcement.
A. In the D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit addresses the abdication exception when it arises,89
but it has a separate approach to agency enforcement policies more generally.
Essentially, it has found that, while Chaney established that individual
nonenforcement decisions are presumptively unreviewable, general and
official enforcement policies are reviewable, regardless of whether they
indicate potential abdication.
In Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Peña,90 the D.C. Circuit
explained its rationale. In Crowley, the Maritime Administrator indicated in
correspondence with Lykes Brothers Steamship Company that it did not need
a waiver to operate foreign-flag ships to certain ports.91 Crowley, a
competitor, contested that Lykes did need a waiver but to no avail—the
Administrator again refused to require a waiver for Lykes.92 Crowley sued93
and, on appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that the Administrator’s decision was
an unreviewable “single-shot non-enforcement decision.”94 Only general
policies were reviewable, and the unofficial correspondence between the
Administrator and Lykes was neither a general policy nor indicative of one.95
The Crowley court distinguished general enforcement policies from
individual decisions. First, it noted that individual enforcement proceedings
involve “mingled assessments of fact, policy, and law . . . that are . . .
peculiarly within the agency’s expertise and discretion.”96 General
enforcement policies also present clearer statements of agency reasons for
nonenforcement, whereas individual nonenforcement decisions “tend to be
cursory, ad hoc, or post hoc.”97 Moreover, an agency’s announcement of a
general nonenforcement policy implicates the potential applicability of the
abdication exception because broad policies can more easily demonstrate

89
See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1,
10–13 (D.D.C. 2013).
90
37 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
91
Id. at 672–73.
92
Id. at 673.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 676 (emphasis omitted). In fact, it was unclear whether the Administrator’s determination
was a nonenforcement decision or an advisory opinion. The court analyzed both possibilities. See id. at
673–74.
95
Id. at 676–77.
96
Id. at 677.
97
Id.
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abdication.98 Lastly, the opinion noted that courts should shy away from
“teasing meaning out of agencies’ side comments, form letters, litigation
documents, and informal communications.”99
This last comment from the D.C. Circuit illustrates the fine line it has
drawn. Consolidated and promulgated general enforcement policies are
reviewable, such as when the policy is part of a formal regulation that
underwent the rulemaking process100 or that articulates a universal policy
statement.101 But documents produced for individual enforcement decisions
are unreviewable102—even when, taken together, they might amount to a
general policy. The exception to this approach is when a document in an
individual nonenforcement decision “would actually lay out a general policy
delineating the boundary between enforcement and non-enforcement and
purport to speak to a broad class of parties.”103 No case yet has presented this
situation.
B. In Other Courts
A few courts outside of the D.C. Circuit have noted its approach
favorably.104 The most recent case discussing both Crowley and the
abdication exception is WildEarth Guardians v. Department of Justice,105 a
98

Id. Despite this comment, the D.C. Circuit has never explicitly used the abdication exception to
find a general enforcement policy reviewable, although it used similar reasoning (that is, searching for a
general pattern) in Jones v. Comptroller of the Currency to review the total nonenforcement there. 983 F.
Supp. 197, 203–04 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d, 1998 WL 315581 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 1998) (per curiam)
(concluding that the court has jurisdiction to review the plaintiff’s claim that the OCC had “failed
generally and programmatically” to administer the Fair Housing Act because the statute imposed an
affirmative mandate on the OCC).
99
Crowley, 37 F.3d at 677.
100
For example, in National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, the EPA argued that Chaney foreclosed
NWF’s challenge to an EPA regulation that gave the EPA discretion whether to initiate certain
proceedings (rather than those proceedings being automatically triggered by a certain finding). 980 F.2d
765, 772–73 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court rejected this argument in part because the NWF challenged a
particular interpretation of the statute embodied in a regulation, rather than challenging particular
decisions not to enforce the statute. Id. at 773.
101
See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
102
This was the situation in Crowley. See 37 F.3d at 676.
103
See id. at 677. Parties have also unsuccessfully invoked the Crowley exception in other cases.
See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 60 F. Supp. 3d 14, 16–19
(D.D.C. 2014) (mem.); K-V Pharm. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 889 F. Supp. 2d 119, 135–40 (D.D.C.
2012) (mem.), vacated on other grounds, No. 12-5349, 2014 WL 68499 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 7, 2014) (per
curiam).
104
So far, a total of four courts outside the D.C. Circuit have explicitly adopted Crowley’s approach.
See, e.g., Riverkeeper v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2004); WildEarth Guardians v. Dep’t of
Justice, 181 F. Supp. 3d 651, 665–68 (D. Ariz. 2015); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 872 F. Supp.
2d 318, 334 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014); Ringo v.
Lombardi, 706 F. Supp. 2d 952, 959–60 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
105
181 F. Supp. 3d at 664–68.
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case in the District of Arizona in which WildEarth Guardians (WEG)
challenged the underenforcement of the ESA’s provisions—including the
underenforcement of the taking prohibition discussed in this Note’s
Introduction.
The ESA allows for the listing of endangered and threatened animal
species by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).106 Once a species is listed,
the statute prohibits taking, possessing, and selling that endangered
species.107 The potential penalties are steep: civil penalties range from $500
for strict liability offenses to $12,000 for violations requiring a mens rea of
“knowingly.”108 Criminal penalties, which all require a mens rea of
knowingly, range from $25,000 to $50,000 and from six months to one year
of incarceration.109 The ESA further allows for citizen suits to enjoin any
person alleged to be in violation of the statute.110
WildEarth Guardians stems from the consequences of an earlier case
concerning the mens rea requirements of the ESA. In United States v.
McKittrick,111 Chad McKittrick was convicted of unlawfully taking,
possessing, and transporting an endangered Mexican wolf.112 He argued on
appeal that the requisite mens rea of knowingly required specific intent—
that the government must prove that he knew the biological identity of the
animal that he was shooting and that it was protected.113 The Ninth Circuit
rejected this interpretation and found that knowingly required only general

106
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012) (codification of Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)); see
also Ashley Crooks et al., Environmental Crimes, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1051, 1143 (2014) (discussing
the purposes behind ESA).
107
See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (D)–(F) (2012). Taking is defined broadly as “to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” a species. Id. § 1532(19) (2012). Both “harm”
and “harass” have further been defined broadly, expanding the prohibition’s reach. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3
(2017). Considering the taking prohibition’s broad scope, severe penalties, and low mens rea threshold,
prosecutorial discretion in enforcing the statute ensures that its provisions are not overprosecuted. See
Jonathan Wood, Overcriminalization and the Endangered Species Act: Mens Rea and Criminal
Convictions for Take, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10496 (2016). Laypeople are unlikely to be familiar with the
approximately 1,500 listed species, and overcriminalization might constitute, for instance, prosecuting
cases in which people stepped on insects without realizing they were protected. See id. at 10506.
108
See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (2012).
109
See id. § 1540(b).
110
See id. § 1540(g)(1)(A). The ESA thus presents the issue that citizen suits may not be able to
reach past violations, whereas government criminal prosecutions can. See infra notes 193–94 and
accompanying text.
111
142 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998).
112
Id. at 1172–73.
113
Id. at 1173.
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intent based on the statute’s legislative history; he needed only to know that
he was shooting an animal that turned out to be protected.114
McKittrick subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied
certiorari.115 The government’s brief, however, backtracked from its previous
position and indicated that the DOJ, in future taking provision cases, would
request jury instructions defining knowingly as requiring specific intent.116
Soon after, the DOJ circulated a memorandum directing federal prosecutors
to do just that.117 This policy, called the McKittrick Policy, applied to
violations of the takings prohibition for all endangered species.118
In WildEarth Guardians, WEG argued that the DOJ’s decisions not to
enforce the ESA were reviewable in part because they reflected a general
policy amounting to an abdication of statutory responsibilities.119 In
response, the DOJ moved to dismiss, arguing that the policy was
unreviewable and that Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability applied
even more strongly in the criminal context.120 The court denied the DOJ’s
114
Id. at 1177. The Fifth Circuit came to the same conclusion. See United States v. Ivey, 949 F.2d
759, 766 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1990). In addition, the
Eleventh Circuit had expressed its agreement with those cases’ reasoning. See United States v. Grigsby,
111 F.3d 806, 817 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Newcomer et al., supra note 5, at 262–66 (discussing
McKittrick and pre-McKittrick case law on the knowingly mens rea under the ESA).
115
See McKittrick v. United States, 525 U.S. 1072 (1999).
116
See Newcomer et al., supra note 5, at 266–67 (discussing this “strange and unexplained” change
in the government’s position).
117
See id. at 267.
118
See id. at 269–70 (relating that due to the McKittrick policy, the shooter of a California Condor
escaped the ESA’s harsher penalties because he would not admit that he knew he was shooting a
California Condor during interviews, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office instead prosecuted under the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
119
See WildEarth Guardians v. Dep’t of Justice, 181 F. Supp. 3d 651, 665–68 (D. Ariz. 2015).
Substantively, WEG alleged that the McKittrick Policy violated the APA because it was “arbitrary,
irrational, and an express policy that completely abdicates DOJ’s responsibility to enforce the criminal
penalties provision of the ESA.” Id. at 658. It is unclear clear whether ultimately proving the applicability
of the abdication exception per se demonstrates that the policy is arbitrary and capricious under the APA,
although this may be the case. See Levy & Duncan, supra note 71, at 627 (noting that Chaney’s abdication
exception relies on the reasoning that abdications are per se arbitrary and capricious).
Of note is that while the district court in WildEarth Guardians seemed to be adopting Crowley’s
general policy approach, it also did a statutory analysis that better reflects the rationale that enforcement
is not totally committed to agency discretion. See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 666
(“Either way, the Court looks to the statute to determine whether the presumption of non-reviewability
has been rebutted.”). Still, the court facially relied upon the general policy exception, see id. at 668 (“The
DOJ admittedly authorizes and carries out enforcement actions pursuant to the McKittrick policy . . . .”),
even if the analysis was at times muddled, see id. at 667 (“The Court finds that DOJ’s actions, including
the adoption of a formal discretionary non-enforcement policy, are subject to ESA guidelines.”).
120
Id. at 658, 664. Another ground on which the DOJ moved to dismiss was that WEG lacked
standing. Id. at 659–60. The plaintiffs here also used the “abdication standing” argument from Texas v.
United States. See supra note 41. The premise of abdication standing is when an agency has abdicated its
duty, the plaintiff has standing to challenge whether the agency has exceeded its statutory power. See
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motion and held that the suit was not barred by Chaney, finding that
prosecutorial discretion “does not include the power to disregard statutory
obligations that apply to the Executive Branch.”121
According to the court, WEG’s allegations rebutted Chaney’s
presumption of unreviewability.122 The DOJ’s actions and the McKittrick
Policy qualified for the abdication exception because the DOJ ignored its
obligations under the ESA.123 The Final Rule for implementing the listing of
the Mexican wolf envisioned vigorous enforcement as “the cornerstone to
preventing illegal killings [which were] the single biggest threat to the
Mexican gray wolf reintroduction program.”124 The McKittrick Policy and
the DOJ’s low number of prosecutions did not align with the Final Rule and
underlying public welfare statutory scheme.125 Together, these demonstrated
potential abdication, and the court further indicated that the McKittrick
Policy might be a general enforcement policy reviewable under Crowley.126
The DOJ later moved for summary judgment, and the district court
again found that the agency action was reviewable because the McKittrick
Policy “[wa]s outside the range of prosecutorial authority set out in ESA’s
comprehensive conservation scheme.”127 In fact, the court found that the
McKittrick Policy incorrectly interpreted the ESA and that by adopting it,
the DOJ had abdicated its statutory responsibility.128 Thus, without even

WildEarth Guardians, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 662–63 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
It was unclear what role this played in the WildEarth Guardians court’s holding that the plaintiffs had
standing because the court still conducted a full standing analysis. See id. at 659–63. Still, considering
how standing requirements preclude citizen suits, see infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text, this
may be a developing avenue to satisfy standing in these situations.
121
WildEarth Guardians, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 665. According to the court, prosecutorial discretion
“only encompasses the Executive Branch’s power to decide whether to initiate charges for legal
wrongdoing and to seek punishment, penalties, or sanctions.” Id.
122
Id. at 667–68.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 661.
125
Id.
126
See id. at 665 (“Plaintiffs’ challenge fits within the door left open in [Chaney] because Plaintiffs
allege the DOJ has formally expressed a general policy of non-enforcement: the McKittrick policy.”
(citation omitted)). But whether the district court ultimately found that the McKittrick Policy is a general
enforcement policy is somewhat unclear. For more on the court’s confusing mix of rationales, see supra
note 119.
127
WildEarth Guardians v. Dep’t of Justice, No. CV-13-00392, 2017 WL 4708022, at *7 (D. Ariz.
June 21, 2017).
128
See id. at *24 (“[T]he DOJ has abdicated its statutory responsibility by adopting the McKittrick
policy which precludes, without discretion, prosecutions for mistakenly and/or carelessly taking, i.e.,
shooting, a wolf.”).
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relying on Crowley’s approach, the district court thus granted summary
judgment for WEG on that count.129
There are two takeaways from WildEarth Guardians. The first is that
courts outside the D.C. Circuit have sometimes adopted Crowley’s rule and
reasoning that general enforcement policies are per se reviewable. Second,
the approach that the court used for the abdication exception analysis was
not total enforcement but severe underenforcement. Even though the DOJ
did not totally stop enforcing the takings prohibition, did not adopt a policy
of total nonenforcement, and inherently had high levels of prosecutorial
discretion in the criminal context, the court still held that the abdication
exception applied.
C. Downsides of Requiring a General Policy
At first, the D.C. Circuit’s approach seems to capture more situations
than the total nonenforcement and severe underenforcement approaches.
Under it, courts can review all general enforcement policies, regardless of
whether they evince any nonenforcement or underenforcement. This
approach poses three distinct issues, however.
First, this approach does not greatly expand what courts can review
under the APA. Agencies rarely promulgate official general enforcement
policies in the way that the Crowley court contemplated. Additionally, the
approach dictates that unofficial agency communications, such as those
connected with individual enforcement decisions, generally cannot establish
such policies, further decreasing the chances of there being a reviewable
policy.130 As long as an agency does not officially adopt a policy through
rulemaking or other means, its enforcement policies will generally remain
unreviewable. But courts can use both the Crowley approach and a severe
underenforcement approach, like the WildEarth Guardians court did,131
which might ameliorate this concern.
This approach is further limited because when there is a general
enforcement policy, review is seemingly limited to whether the agency has
properly construed the relevant statute.132 For example, in OSG Bulk Ships,
Inc. v. United States, the D.C. Circuit found that the Maritime
129

See id. at *1. In doing so, the district court seemed to assume that an abdication of statutory
responsibility was per se arbitrary and capricious. See also supra note 119.
130
See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text; see also K-V Pharm. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
889 F. Supp. 2d 119, 136–37 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that a letter connected to an individual enforcement
decision did not indicate a general enforcement policy).
131
See supra Section III.B.
132
See, e.g., OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 808, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Edison Elec.
Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Roane v. Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216, 226–27 (D.D.C.
2009); Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 171–72 (D.D.C. 2000).
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Administration’s longstanding interpretation of a statute was a general
enforcement policy.133 In reviewing the policy, however, the court conducted
a deferential Chevron analysis.134 Under Chevron deference, with which
courts examine the reasonableness of an agency’s statutory interpretation,135
a general enforcement policy that amounts to total nonenforcement or severe
underenforcement may still be reasonable due to the high amount of
deference, and thus this approach does not guard against them.
Second, this approach creates a perverse incentive for agencies not to
adopt general enforcement policies, which can be beneficial in guiding both
the agency and industries. Because courts using the general policy approach
will review all enforcement policies—regardless of whether they constitute
total nonenforcement, severe underenforcement, or neither—under this
approach, agencies suddenly have an incentive not to adopt any enforcement
policies at all. This may lead to a lack of uniformity and clarity in
enforcement policies because even internal directives like the McKittrick
Policy may qualify as reviewable general enforcement policies.
Third, the D.C. Circuit’s approach seems inconsistent with the Court’s
concerns in Chaney. True, the Court used the phrase “general policy.”136 But
it did so only in the context of a general policy amounting to abdication.137
The Court also did not specify that such a policy had to come from official
agency documents. In fact, there were no such documents in Adams v.
Richardson, to which the Court cited. That policy was unannounced.138 So
while general policies may be reviewable for other reasons, the Court
demonstrated that, in Chaney, it was distinctly concerned with agencies
effectively halting enforcement efforts.139 So, although the general
enforcement policy approach potentially reaches new activity and might
vindicate other important policies, it is not a viable substitute for a severe
underenforcement or even a total nonenforcement approach.
IV. UNDERENFORCEMENT AS ABDICATION
While most courts have taken the approach that abdication includes
only total nonenforcement, a few have interpreted abdication more
expansively. These courts found that severe underenforcement also qualifies
133
See 132 F.3d at 812. The agency consistently referenced the policy in its letters and other
representations to various parties. Id. at 811.
134
See id. at 812.
135
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
136
See 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).
137
See id.
138
See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam).
139
See supra Section II.C.
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as abdication. To explore this, Section IV.A first describes these cases and
explains how they reflect the severe underenforcement approach. Next,
Section IV.B details how severe underenforcement poses just as many
pressing concerns as total nonenforcement. Section IV.B.1 examines how
severe underenforcement harms certain complex statutory schemes, whereas
Section IV.B.2 discusses the pressing constitutional and balance-of-powers
concerns implicated by severe underenforcement. Lastly, Section IV.C
argues that courts should interpret abdication to include severe
underenforcement and explores how they might do so.
A. In the Courts
In interpreting what amounts to abdication, a few courts have looked
beyond whether there is total nonenforcement to see whether an agency is
engaging in severe underenforcement. These courts have been more willing
to infer a general policy amounting to abdication from patterns of agencies’
nonenforcement decisions, even if those decisions are relatively rare.
An example is Roman v. Korson,140 in which migrant farm workers sued
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), alleging that the
USDA had failed to enforce labor housing regulations with notice-andcomment and rollback provisions.141 The farm workers argued that the
USDA’s consistent failure to enforce these provisions amounted to
abdication,142 and the USDA argued that there was no abdication because it
had enforced some provisions.143 The agency, however, had enforced the
rollback provisions just once in eight years144 and seemingly never enforced
the notice-and-comment requirements for borrowers.145 Furthermore, there
were no ongoing attempts at enforcement.146 Thus, the court found that the
USDA’s policies appeared “to be to not enforce the rebate and rollback
provisions for fear that they will cause economic hardships on borrowers.”147
The court therefore rejected the USDA’s arguments and held that, because
the USDA “failed in a systematic way to enforce its mandatory
regulations,”148 the agency’s nonenforcement decisions were reviewable. 149
140

918 F. Supp. 1108 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
Id. at 1110.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 1110–11.
144
Id. at 1113.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. (emphasis added).
148
Id. at 1114.
149
Id. at 1112–13. The court extended the abdication theory to duties established by regulation in
addition to those established by statute. See id. at 1112 (citing to decisions from the First, Third, Sixth,
141
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Roman contrasts with cases handled under the total nonenforcement
approach. For a court using the complete nonenforcement approach,
enforcing the statute just once may have been enough to disqualify
challengers from accessing the abdication exception, even if there were no
ongoing attempts at enforcement. The Roman court emphasized, however,
that enforcing the statute at least once is not enough to escape the
applicability of the abdication exception.150 The court went beyond the total
nonenforcement approach to find that the agency had abdicated its duties
because it had severely underenforced its regulatory responsibilities.
Another example is Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service.151 There,
the Forest Service was required to review and authorize the transportation of
“mega-loads” on a highway crossing Nez Perce Tribe reservation lands,152
which included consultation with the Tribe.153 When a company informed the
Forest Service that it intended to transport a load before any review was
completed, however, the Forest Service did nothing,154 even though it knew
the planned date for the shipment and received a phone call from the Nez
Perce Tribal Chairman about enforcement.155 The load passed unimpeded.156
The Nez Perce Tribe sued, arguing that the agency action was reviewable
because the Forest Service clearly abdicated their statutory responsibility in
failing to stop the load before it could consult the Tribe.157 The court found
that this was a reviewable abdication of the Forest Service’s statutory
duties.158
and D.C. Circuits recognizing that “regulations can serve as a basis for judicial review of agency
enforcement decisions”).
150
Id. at 1113.
151
No. 3:13-CV-348-BLW, 2013 WL 5212317 (D. Idaho Sept. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Nez Perce
Tribe I).
152
Id. at *2–3.
153
Id. at *3.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at *4.
157
Id.
158
Id. at *6. Interestingly, the parties did not even raise the abdication exception in their pleadings.
See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nez Perce Tribe I, 2013 WL
5213340 (D. Idaho Sept. 6, 2013); United States Forest Service’s Answer to First Amended Complaint,
Nez Perce Tribe I, 2013 WL 5985245 (D. Idaho Oct. 31, 2013). On a motion for reconsideration by
intervenor Resources Conservation Company International (RCCI), RCCI raised the issue of the
abdication exception to argue that it did not apply. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant–Intervenor
RCCI’s Expedited Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, to Stay Injunction Pending Appeal at 9–
11, Nez Perce Tribe, 2013 WL 5442226 (D. Idaho Sept. 20, 2013). The court, however, denied
reconsideration. See Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 3:13-CV-348-BLW, 2013 WL 5592765
(D. Idaho Oct. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Nez Perce Tribe II) (failing to address RCCI’s argument about
Chaney). RCCI later stipulated to dismissal, see Stipulation of Dismissal, Nez Perce Tribe, 2013 WL
6778549 (D. Idaho Dec. 17, 2013), and so these issues were never reviewed on appeal.
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The court’s comments in Nez Perce Tribe demonstrate how the court
used a severe underenforcement approach. Rather than challenging a
seemingly consistent failure to enforce a statute, the plaintiffs challenged the
agency’s singular failure to halt Omega–Morgan’s shipment.159 Moreover,
the Forest Service was attempting to complete a corridor study and consult
with the Tribe, so it had partially enforced the statute.160 The Nez Perce Tribe
court, however, dismissed these reasons for why the abdication exception
should not apply. Under a total nonenforcement approach, this would likely
have disqualified the Tribe from accessing the abdication exception. But the
Tribe was not disqualified, demonstrating that the court interpreted
abdication as severe underenforcement.
Whitaker v. Clementon Housing Authority161 is another case in which
the reviewing court found that an agency refusing to enforce in one situation
was sufficient abdication.162 Whitaker sued the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), alleging that HUD failed to enforce certain
rules it promulgated in a handbook, which resulted in Whitaker being evicted
and disqualified from Section 8 subsidization.163 In response, HUD argued
that its decision not to enforce those regulations was unreviewable under
Chaney.164 The court rejected that argument, holding instead that HUD’s
nonenforcement decisions were reviewable.165 Not only did HUD fail to take
enforcement action, but it also “discouraged plaintiff from seeking
enforcement of her rights elsewhere.”166 That reflected a general policy
amounting to a reviewable abdication of HUD’s responsibilities.167

159

See Nez Perce Tribe I, 2013 WL 5212317, at *2–4.
See id. at *4.
161
788 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.J. 1992).
162
See id. at 231–32. While the court ultimately seemed to find a judicially manageable standard by
which to judge HUD’s actions, see id. at 232 (finding a directive in the HUD handbook to be a “clear[]
constraint on agency discretion”), it first found that “[t]o the extent that [HUD’s actions] reflect[ed] a
general policy ‘consciously and expressly adopted,’” constituting an abdication of HUD’s statutory
responsibilities, then “HUD’s decision in this matter is of a type that was specifically excluded from the
scope of the Chaney holding by the Supreme Court,” id. at 231. While the ultimate holding—HUD’s
actions are reviewable—is clear, it is unclear whether the court viewed these as alternate (and
independent) or dependent holdings.
163
Id. at 228.
164
Id. at 228–29.
165
Id. at 231–32 (noting that “the Third Circuit appears to generally view the barrier to reviewability
erected by Chaney as minimal”).
166
Id. at 231.
167
Id. The court’s willingness to interpret abdication more broadly is also seen in the fact that it used
an unofficial handbook as a standard against which to measure the agency action. Id. at 229–30. This was
based on the reasoning that some courts had held that HUD handbooks can be binding on the agency in
certain circumstances and because the handbook reflected statutory principles. Id. at 229 (citing
Burroughs v. Hills, 564 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1983)).
160
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The court in Whitaker also adopted a type of severe underenforcement
approach. It was willing to infer a general policy from just one incident of
nonenforcement that it considered severe. The court did not even discuss
whether the agency had enforced its duties more generally. Its reasoning was
based on how the plaintiff made multiple requests of HUD and how HUD
failed to enforce each time.168 That sufficed to demonstrate a general policy
amounting to abdication. Under a total nonenforcement approach, though,
not enforcing its duties as to just one person would not suffice.
These three cases are incompatible with the complete nonenforcement
approach. Instead, they better reflect the severe underenforcement approach.
These courts’ approaches allowed review of more nonenforcement decisions
than is permitted under the approaches of most courts. For instance, under
this approach, a case like PETA may have qualified for the abdication
exception because the agency had refused to enforce the statute in question
multiple times.169 The three courts here went beyond examining whether the
agency had totally halted enforcement of a statute and examined whether it
had severely underenforced the statute to achieve substantially the same
effect.
It is unclear why these courts, as well as the courts in Adams and
WildEarth Guardians, chose to adopt the severe underenforcement
approach. One theory might be that the plaintiffs were all seemingly
vulnerable and sympathetic. In Adams, which occurred against the backdrop
of a highly charged period of racial tension, the nonenforcement involved
funding segregated schools.170 WildEarth Guardians involved endangered
Mexican grey wolves that cannot politically or legally defend themselves.171
In Roman, the challengers were migrant farm workers, a group that
historically has had little legal or political power.172 As for Nez Perce Tribe,
the Native American tribes have occupied an uneasy ground between
168

Id. at 228.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animas v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C.
2013); see also supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
170
See Adams v. Richards, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164–65 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also supra notes 36–40
and accompanying text.
171
See supra Section III.B for a discussion of the WildEarth Guardians case. Admittedly, the
WildEarth Guardians case does not fit as well into this analysis as the other cases because the other cases
involve human plaintiffs who were potentially harmed by the agency decision not to enforce.
172
See supra notes 141–51 and accompanying text. For more information on the political and legal
issues surrounding migrant farm workers, see generally Michael A. Celone, Comment, Undocumented
and Unprotected: Solutions for Protecting the Health of America’s Undocumented Mexican Migrant
Workers, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 117 (2012); Jane Younglove Lapp, Comment, The Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act: “Rumors of My Death Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated,” 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 173 (1993); Viviana Patino, Migrant Farm Worker
Advocacy: Empowering the Invisible Laborer, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43 (1987).
169
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sovereigns and subjects, resulting in difficulty in protecting their lands and
resources.173 Lastly, Whitaker featured a woman with a young son who was
evicted three years prior and still could not afford an apartment without
Section 8 subsidization.174 Perhaps seeing the tangible impact of
underenforcement highlighted to these courts that severe underenforcement
poses many of the same dangers as total nonenforcement.
B. Severe Underenforcement’s Consequences
First, like total nonenforcement, an agency’s severe underenforcement
of a statute implicates the Chaney Court’s concerns: it can sap the strength
of statutes that agencies are congressionally mandated to enforce.175 The
consequences of severe underenforcement are especially dire when agencies
underenforce complex statutory schemes with overlapping civil and criminal
penalties, and that are dependent on the federal government for full
enforcement. Thus, Section IV.B.1 discusses those characteristics in the
context of environmental law as an example. Section IV.B.2 then explores
the potential constitutional separation of powers and pragmatic balance of
powers concerns that severe underenforcement poses.
1. Harms to Complex Statutory Schemes
Severe underenforcement can cripple complex statutory schemes,
especially those with two common characteristics. The first is complex and
overlapping provisions—underenforcing one provision can impair the others
and their deterrent effect. This is especially the case in statutes that provide
both civil and criminal penalties. The second characteristic is heavy
dependence upon federal enforcement, such as when the federal scheme
preempts state law or when citizen-suit provisions are nonexistent or
ineffective. In these cases, there are few other measures to rectify federal
underenforcement.
Environmental statutes frequently feature both characteristics and serve
as a useful illustration. First, many environmental statutes, like the Clean
Water Act (CWA) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),

173
See supra notes 152–59 and accompanying text. For more information on the legal status of
Native American tribes, see CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 577–79 (2d ed.
2009). In fact, in Nez Perce Tribe, the court emphasized the unique trustee relationship between the
federal government and Native American tribes. Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 3:13-CV348-BLW, 2013 WL 5212317, at *5–6 (D. Idaho Sept. 12, 2013).
174
Whitaker v. Clemington Hous. Auth., 788 F. Supp. 226, 227–28 (D.N.J. 1992); see also supra
notes 162–69 and accompanying text.
175
See supra Section II.C.
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provide for overlapping civil and criminal penalties.176 Severely
underenforcing a single provision can diminish the deterrent effects of entire
statutory schemes. The effectiveness of these statutes depends, in part, on
robust enforcement of the statutes’ penalties to deter parties from violating
them. This is especially true for criminal violations.
Criminal prosecutions generally require prosecutorial discretion:
prosecutors must consider complex factors in determining how to best
allocate limited resources.177 For example, the DOJ considers several factors
when deciding whether to prosecute under criminal provisions of
environmental statutes.178 Because that kind of judgment involves inherent
prosecutorial discretion, courts are loath to question their decisions.179 Only
in rare circumstances will courts interfere with them.180 Moreover,
questioning prosecutorial decisions may inappropriately reveal enforcement
patterns, facilitating the ability of actors to escape enforcement.181
But in the context of environmental statutes, too much discretion can
undercut entire statutory schemes. Criminal penalties under most

176

See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b)–(c), (g) (2012) (CWA allowing the Administrator to commence civil
actions and providing criminal penalties for knowing violations); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (g) (2012) (RCRA
providing criminal penalties for knowing violations and allowing the Administrator to further seek civil
penalties); see also Crooks et al., supra note 106, at 1054 & n.12 (discussing overlapping penalties in
environmental statutes).
177
See Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 32, at 681–82. This is especially true considering
the increasingly overlapping nature of federal crimes with each other and with state crimes. See id.
178
See Crooks et al., supra note 106, at 1056–57. This includes (a) voluntary disclosure, (b)
cooperation, (c) preventative measures and compliance programs, (d) pervasiveness of noncompliance,
(e) internal disciplinary action, and (f) subsequent compliance efforts. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE
CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR
(1991),
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/selected-publications/factors-decisions-criminal-prosecutions
[https://perma.cc/22ZF-7KRQ].
179
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has
exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”); Smith v. United
States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967) (“The discretion of the Attorney General in choosing whether
to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution already started, is absolute.”).
180
See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“We will not
interfere with the Attorney General’s prosecutorial discretion unless it is abused to such an extent as to
be arbitrary and capricious and violative of due process.”); see also Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra
note 32, at 683–84 (describing how courts “have disclaimed virtually any authority to review executive
charging decisions”).
181
For these reasons, an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act protects agency documents,
the production of which “would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if
such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
(2012); see also Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1192–93 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that the
exception’s broadness is due to “the importance of deterrence” in ensuring enforcement of the laws).
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environmental statutes exceed the corresponding civil penalties.182 Under the
ESA, for instance, criminal penalties are much higher and thus a much
stronger deterrent.183 A hunter might find that “taking” an endangered grizzly
bear is worth up to $12,000 if he knows he will not face criminal
enforcement, including incarceration.184 The same is true of industry actors,
who may find that the low civil violation costs of “harming” a population of
endangered Gila trout does not exceed the monetary benefits of constructing
a business complex.
Lack of criminal enforcement further diminishes complex statutory
schemes for crimes that are solely federal. In other areas of the law, federal
offenses overlap with each other and with state substantive offenses.185 But
this is rarely true for environmental statutes. The state may lack equivalent
environmental legislation,186 the federal statute may preempt state law,187 or
the federal scheme may preempt federal common law.188 Federal
enforcement is thus pivotal to maintaining the vitality of these provisions,
especially the criminal provisions, so as not to cripple an entire scheme
hinging upon enforcement and deterrence. Severely underenforcing those
provisions saps the schemes of their strength.
Environmental laws often have this second characteristic—they rely on
federal enforcement. There are two potential exceptions. First, some statutes
established cooperative federalism schemes that allow the states to enforce
certain provisions.189 Not all states have taken advantage of this, however,
182

See generally Crooks et al., supra note 106 (discussing criminal and civil penalties under
environmental statutes).
183
See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text (discussing penalties under the ESA).
184
“Taking” includes killing. See 16 U.S.C.§ 1532(19) (2012).
185
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 518–
19 (2001) (discussing, for example, the federal criminal code’s general false statement statute along with
its “seemingly endless” statutes prohibiting false statements in specific settings).
186
For instance, some states have their own versions of the ESA, see, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§§ 2051–2115.5 (West 1984), but even the most robust of these statutes lack the federal ESA’s punch,
see, e.g., Lynn E. Dwyer & Dennis D. Murphy, Fulfilling the Promise: Reconsidering and Reforming the
California Endangered Species Act, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 735, 742–44 (1995) (describing how—
despite similar statutory language—California’s ESA is weaker than the federal ESA “in interpretation
and practice”).
187
See, e.g., Rollins Envtl. Servs. (FS), Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 1985)
(finding that the federal Toxic Substances Control Act (TOSCA) preempted an ordinance banning
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)).
188
See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 332 (1981) (finding that CWA preempted a federal
common law nuisance suit).
189
See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens: Part One: Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit
Provisions, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 408 (2004); see also John C. Chambers, Jr., & Peter L. Gray,
EPA and State Roles in RCRA and CERCLA, 4 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 7, 7–8 (1989) (describing
RCRA’s and CERCLA’s schemes for delegating power to state agencies).
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and in some cases the federal government retains enforcement authority over
certain actions.190 Federal enforcement thus retains importance even under
those schemes.
The second potential exception is citizen suits, which most
environmental statutes feature. Citizen-suit provisions allow members of the
interested public to act as private attorneys general and bring enforcement
suits.191 This seemingly lessens reliance on federal enforcement, which
alleviates concerns about federal underenforcement. However, citizen suits
lack the same reach and effectiveness as federal enforcement in four ways.
First, citizen suits do not extend to criminal prohibitions. Criminal suits must,
by their nature, be brought by the government. Thus, the prohibitions with
the heaviest penalties rely exclusively on government enforcement.
Second, citizen suits often cannot reach as much activity as government
enforcement actions can. For example, under RCRA, the citizen-suit
provision provides for suits against persons “alleged to be in violation,”
meaning presently in violation of RCRA’s requirements.192 Government
enforcement actions, on the other hand, encompass both ongoing and past
violations.193 Under RCRA, the EPA could choose to rarely enforce past
violations. Citizen suits cannot rectify this. And if that underenforcement
pattern became apparent, potential violators could time their violations to
occur for short time periods to escape enforcement—thus lessening the
statute’s deterrent effect.194
Third, citizen suits face the hurdle of Article III standing requirements.
Parties must demonstrate that they have suffered an actual and imminent
injury in fact that is traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a
favorable decision.195 Meeting these requirements, especially those of injury
in fact and redressability, can be especially difficult in environmental suits.196
Ameliorating this is the fact that states receive “special solicitude” when
190

See Chambers & Gray, supra note 189, at 7–8.
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (CWA’s citizen-suit provision). States can also sue under
citizen-suit provisions. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–21 (2007).
192
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012) (emphasis added).
193
Id. § 6973. This is true for other statutes as well. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012)
(ESA’s citizen-suit provision for present violations); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (CWA’s citizen-suit provision
for present violations). This was once the case under the Clean Air Act (CAA), see Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1987), but Congress subsequently
amended the CAA to allow citizen suits to reach past violations, see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2012).
194
Cf. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(noting concern that violators could take advantage of a good day to claim they are no longer in violation
of the statute).
195
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
196
See, e.g., id. at 562–64, 568–71 (finding that parties did not meet the injury-in-fact and
redressability elements).
191
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suing under citizen-suit provisions because states may try to fill a federal
underenforcement gap.197 But still, this doctrine is unclear and depends on
states wanting to sue, and these requirements still hinder citizen suits.198
Lastly, citizen suits cannot counteract underenforcement when the
government does enforce the statute but does so with more difficult-to-meet
requirements than used in citizen suits. An example of the agency requiring
a higher standard is the McKittrick Policy, which requires prosecutors to be
able to demonstrate the standard of specific intent to initiate ESA
prosecutions.199 Citizen-suit provisions require that notice be tendered to the
violator and administering agency and that there be a delay between notice
and bringing suit.200 This is meant to give the agency time to bring an
enforcement action on its own. If the federal or state government brings an
enforcement action, a citizen suit is thus precluded.201 So if an agency
required higher standards than a citizen suit, then the government could bring
an action under that difficult-to-meet standard and preclude citizen
enforcement actions. That suit would likely have a higher chance of failure
due to the higher standards imposed by the government. For these reasons,
citizen suits cannot completely fill the gaps caused by underenforcement
when statutes rely on federal enforcement. Severe underenforcement
therefore can cripple complex statutory schemes with these characteristics.
2. Constitutional and Balance of Powers Concerns
Severe underenforcement also presents two broad constitutional
concerns and other pragmatic balance of powers issues. First, severe
197
When states sue to protect their “quasi-sovereign interests, [they are] entitled to special solicitude
in [the] standing analysis.” See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). What that means is still
not entirely clear, but it seems that states can more easily satisfy Article III standing requirements. See
Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited
Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 397–98 (2011). See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption
State Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2017) (exploring when a state has standing to sue the
government based on Executive Branch underenforcement).
198
Indeed, some scholars argue that the tightening of standing requirements has allowed for
administrative overreach. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 101–
32 (2014).
199
See supra note 116 and accompanying text. The McKittrick Policy is not a perfect example
because it applies in the criminal context and citizen-suit provisions cannot compel criminal enforcement.
However, a similar policy for civil actions would raise this issue.
200
See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (2012); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b) (2012).
201
See 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b); Miller, supra note 189, at 409. State suits may
also be precluded if the federal government sues, and vice versa, due to concerns of overfiling and
overenforcement. See, e.g., Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that
EPA cannot file suit if the state has filed suit under its delegated powers under RCRA). But see, e.g.,
United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that EPA can file suit
if it gives the state notice).
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underenforcement potentially violates the constitutional principle underlying
separation of powers, and specifically the Presentment Clause,202 by
effectively allowing the President to repeal laws. Second, severe
underenforcement may also violate the Take Care Clause203 because the
President either is suspending or dispensing with the laws or is not faithfully
executing the laws. In addition, the lack of judicial review for severe
underenforcement presents sub-constitutional balance of powers concerns.
First, severe underenforcement potentially allows the Executive to
effectively repeal laws, which is a legislative power.204 The President has one
chance to veto a statute under the Presentment Clause.205 Severe
underenforcement after a statute has been passed, however, can achieve
substantially the same effect: although the statute remains on the books, it is
rarely enforced.206 Suppose that a President faces difficulty in achieving her
policy goals, or wants to expeditiously enact policies while she has a
Congress that will not oppose her, and directs an agency to only bring a few
enforcement actions per year under a particular statute.207 The abdication
exception, as it is currently interpreted, likely does not allow review of these
decisions not to enforce. Unless the agency completely stopped enforcing
the statute or adopted a general enforcement policy—which is unlikely,
considering how easy it is to sidestep those prerequisites—these
nonenforcement decisions would remain unreviewable under the APA. Even
if congressional members were to sue the President for a constitutional
violation of the Presentment Clause or other separation of powers principles,
it is unclear whether they would have standing or whether the suit would be
202

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
204
This ultimately may be a temporary repeal because the next administration can just as easily undo
it. One vivid example is how the Trump Administration rescinded the Obama Administration’s
memorandum establishing DACA. See Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al.,
Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children” (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/J9FG-DMKB]. For more on the original
memoranda establishing DACA, see supra note 14.
205
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
206
That implied statutory repeals are disfavored, see Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009),
makes this especially egregious: The President can accomplish through severe underenforcement what
otherwise takes concerted legislative effort.
207
This is not so farfetched. See Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 32, at 687 (“In an era of
partisan polarization and legislative gridlock, Presidents often cannot count on Congress to develop
legislative solutions to perceived problems, or even to negotiate over such solutions in good faith.
Nevertheless, the public increasingly holds the President accountable for all failures of national policy.
Reliance on all forms of executive authority, without resort to Congress, thus becomes a nearly irresistible
temptation for modern Presidents.”). Consider the Obama Administration’s underenforcement of certain
immigration directives as a potential example. See supra notes 14 & 41.
203
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nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.208 Severe
underenforcement is thus potentially unreviewable under the APA and
nonjusticiable under the Presentment Clause.
Second, severe underenforcement may violate the Take Care Clause.
Under the Take Care Clause, the President “shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”209 Once a law is passed, the President is the one tasked
with ensuring that it is enforced, even if she retains some discretion enforcing
it.210 The President cannot totally ignore a law or dispense with it as to certain

208

Congress likely has standing to sue when the President fails to enforce a duly enacted and
unambiguous statute. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 446 (1939). Yet it is unclear how far that
extends to severe underenforcement rather than total nonenforcement. See generally Bethany R. Pickett,
Note, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional Standing in Instances of Presidential
Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439 (2016) (analyzing Congressional standing and political
question precedent and arguing that members of Congress should have standing to sue when there is
executive nonenforcement).
Notably, in 2014, the House of Representatives sued various Obama Administration officials based
on the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), including the Administration’s delay in
implementing certain provisions. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d. 53, 57
(D.D.C. 2015) (mem.). The plaintiffs presented two theories for standing, which the district court termed
the “Non–Appropriation Theory” and the “Employer–Mandate Theory.” See id. at 70. The gist of the
Non–Appropriation Theory was that the “Executive ha[d] spent billions of dollars without a valid
appropriation, in direct contravention of [the Appropriations Clause].” Id. at 69. The Employer–Mandate
Theory alleged that the Secretary of the Treasury “ha[d] not abided by the employer mandate as it was
enacted in the ACA, thereby ‘nullifying’ the law.” Id. (quoting plaintiff’s complaint).
The court first found that the House had standing for its constitutional claims under the Non–
Appropriation Theory, see id. at 74, highlighting that it was a specific constitutional claim that “the
Executive ha[d] drawn funds from the Treasury without a congressional appropriation” in violation of the
Constitution. See id. at 70. As for the Employer–Mandate Theory, which contained the claim challenging
the delayed implementation of the ACA, the House essentially argued “that any member of the Executive
who exceeds his statutory authority is unconstitutionally legislating.” Id. at 75. That “argument prove[d]
too much” for the court. Id. Holding otherwise, according to the court, would transform “every instance
of an extra-statutory action” into “a cognizable constitutional violation, redressable by Congress through
a lawsuit.” Id. But this “would contradict decades of administrative law and precedent.” Id. (“In sum,
Article I is not a talisman; citing its most general provisions does not transform a statutory violation into
a constitutional case or controversy.”).
While the court did not address the abdication exception, or the issues implicated by severe
underenforcement or total nonenforcement, this case suggests that the House (and the Senate) would
likely not have standing in such situations because they would lack a cognizable injury. And although the
House might have standing under a Non–Appropriation Theory for specific constitutional violations of
the Appropriations Clause, delays in implementing laws, instances of severe underenforcement, or total
nonenforcement are unlikely to present that situation—in fact, fewer resources may be spent. Thus,
Congress may lack the ability to redress these issues through constitutional claims in the courts.
209
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
210
This is arguably despite policy differences with the enacting or current Congress. See Robert J.
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration
Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 794 (2013).
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persons.211 Doing so is an exercise of an unconstitutional suspension or
dispensing power.212 Severe underenforcement, though, closely resembles an
exercise of such a power because the law has effectively been suspended or
dispensed with as to certain situations.213 And even if severe
underenforcement is not a suspension or dispensing of the laws, it may be an
unfaithful execution of the laws, which is arguably unconstitutional.214 The
exact scope of the Take Care Clause, however, is an open question, and it is
unclear whether a claim under the Take Care Clause is even justiciable.215
In sum, severe underenforcement is generally unreviewable under the
APA and Chaney. Claims that severe underenforcement violates the
Presentment Clause or Take Care Clause are likely nonjusticiable. Outside
of the courtroom, Congress has little realistic power or incentive to check the
President’s underenforcement;216 inside it, members may lack standing to

211

See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (“To contend that
the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their
execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”).
212
See id.; Blackman, supra note 70, at 219–33; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 210, at 803–08. The
suspension power is “the power to set aside the operation of a statute for a time.” LOIS G. SCHWOERER,
THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 59–60 (1981). Similarly, the dispensing power is “the power to
grant permission to an individual or a corporation to disobey a statute.” Id. at 60.
213
For instance, the deferred-action immigration initiatives under the Obama Administration
allowed certain groups that were statutorily designated as unlawfully present to gain lawful-presence
status. See supra note 14. That may have constituted an exercise of the dispensing power.
214
I use “arguably” because the Court has rarely discussed what constitutes a violation of the Take
Care Clause. Some scholars, however, have argued that an unfaithful execution of the laws is
unconstitutional. See Blackman, supra note 70, at 267–80; Randy Barnett, The President’s Duty of Good
Faith
Performance,
WASH.
POST:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Jan.
12,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/12/the-presidents-duty-of-goodfaith-performance/?utm_term=.470959fffb0f [https://perma.cc/WQJ4-2W2L].
215
The most relevant case on justiciability is Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866),
in which Mississippi sued President Andrew Johnson to enjoin enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts.
The Court found that the President’s duties in enforcing laws involved discretion, rather than being mere
ministerial duties, and thus “court[s] ha[d] no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties.” Id. at 501; see also Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 600 (denying “the
power of the judiciary to interfere in advance, and to instruct the executive . . . how to act”). Justiciability
was also an issue debated in the briefs of the recent case of Texas v. United States. 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.
2015). In fact, the Supreme Court added the question of whether DAPA violated the Take Care Clause
when it granted certiorari. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). But because the Court
affirmed by an equally divided vote, see United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), the question
remains unresolved.
216
Using the power of the purse to reduce spending for underenforced statutes would likely do little;
moreover, using it to reduce other spending may result in electoral backlash or other negative
consequences (such as underenforcement of those statutes). There are realistically few effective checks
on Presidential inaction. See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation
of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (2014). Arguably, one potential check is the electoral process
and the potential subsequent destruction of the President’s legacy. But it is unclear how much the electoral
process is a check on a President facing a recalcitrant Congress, a President lacking any compelling

1205

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

sue. The judiciary has thus closed all avenues for review of severe
underenforcement policies. In doing so, it has inappropriately bowed out of
its duty to interpret the law.217
Severe underenforcement also upsets the balance of powers among the
three branches. For instance, severe underenforcement relieves pressure on
Congress to consider whether certain statutes are still aligned with current
preferences. 218 This could potentially “reduce incentives for lawmakers to
undertake the hard bargains and difficult votes that are often necessary to
enact significant legislation.”219 Consequently, although Congress is the
branch entrusted with making policy decisions and is most directly
accountable to the electorate, it might no longer make these pivotal
decisions.
Moreover, courts’ failure to review severe underenforcement can add
to the already high levels of interbranch conflict.220 The lack of judicial
review and judicial remedy in cases of severe underenforcement removes the
judiciary from its potential role as arbiter, which can exacerbate interbranch
tensions.221 For instance, if the President escalates policy-driven
nonenforcement and underenforcement efforts due to Congressional
gridlock and the judiciary will not step in, Congress may escalate its
responses.222 Rather than easing gridlock, this can intensify it.223
To be sure, there are important concerns about letting courts review
underenforcement that should not be dismissed. For example, the President
is in a tough situation when faced with an obstructionist Congress or with a
pressing issue that requires an immediate response. Some scholars have
argued that when Congress refuses to enact legislation or policies, it is
appropriate for the President to respond with nonenforcement and
underenforcement.224 Moreover, the President may have a prerogative not to

incentive to garner public support (such as a President serving her second term who will personally face
little electoral backlash), or even simply on a President who cares little about approval ratings.
217
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1382–83 (1998) (advocating for the idea
of the federal judiciary as a separation of powers umpire).
218
See Price, Politics, supra note 9, at 1146; Stuntz, supra note 185, at 546–49.
219
Price, Politics, supra note 9, at 1147.
220
See id. at 1145–46.
221
See id.
222
Id. at 1146.
223
Id.
224
See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2014)
(arguing that nonenforcement tactics are a proportional and appropriate response to violations of
legislative norms such as obstructive filibustering).
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enforce laws in certain situations, such as when there is a compelling public
necessity225 or when the President believes a law to be unconstitutional.226
Courts reviewing severe underenforcement may also upset the
separation of powers and interbranch balance in three ways. First, the
Executive must have some discretion in allocating scarce enforcement
resources,227 especially when enforcing criminal statutes.228 Permitting courts
to review nonenforcement decisions may endanger that discretion. Second,
allowing courts to review, and perhaps mandate, enforcement potentially
collapses the boundaries between the Judicial and Executive Branches by
effectively allowing the judiciary to enforce the laws.229 Lastly, there may be
a diminishment of judicial authority if the Executive refuses to comply with
a court’s order.230
These are legitimate concerns, but allowing judicial review of severe
underenforcement under the APA does not necessarily implicate them.
Severe underenforcement exceeds the individual discretion contemplated by
prosecutorial discretion.231 The Court recognized this in establishing the
abdication exception in the first place.232 In addition, a court need not
mandate enforcement. If the court reviews a general policy amounting to
abdication, then it can find that policy arbitrary and capricious under the
APA,233 which alleviates the above concerns.234

225
See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 210, at 808–35. Professors Delahunty and Yoo do generally
limit this executive prerogative power to the national security and foreign affairs contexts. See id. at 823–
28 (discussing how “American constitutional practice shows that [the prerogative power] has been
reserved to national security and foreign affairs”).
226
See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws,
96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1616–17 (2008); Stepanicich, supra note 73, 1536–38.
227
See Stepanicich, supra note 73, at 1538–39.
228
See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005) (discussing “[t]he deeprooted nature of law-enforcement discretion, even in the presence of seemingly mandatory legislative
commands”).
229
See Price, Law Enforcement, supra note 75, at 1573. But see Sunstein, supra note 25, 669–71
(arguing that this “promotes rather than undermines” separation of powers in cases of statutory violations
by the Executive).
230
But see Sunstein, supra note 25, at 670–71 (rejecting this argument).
231
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
232
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985).
233
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
234
A finding that the policy was arbitrary and capricious would send the policy back to the agency
rather than require immediate enforcement. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (remanding to the Court of Appeals with instructions to
remand to the agency for further consideration after finding that the policy in question was arbitrary and
capricious). Any new policy the agency devised would have to not constitute severe underenforcement
to escape another finding of arbitrary and capricious in a later suit.
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C. Underenforcement as Abdication
Most courts and scholars have interpreted Chaney’s abdication
exception as including total nonenforcement but not severe
underenforcement. As previously discussed, they have misread Chaney to
preclude review of anything except total nonenforcement.235 Moreover, this
interpretation overlooks the serious concerns that severe underenforcement
poses—many of which align with those that total enforcement also presents.
To alleviate these concerns, courts should interpret severe underenforcement
as amounting to abdication sufficient to rebut Chaney’s presumption of
unreviewability.236
The main obstacle to adopting a severe underenforcement approach is
that courts are unwilling to infer a general policy from repeated
nonenforcement and unofficial agency representations. Admittedly, it is
easier in some cases to infer that there is a policy than in others. Recall the
McKittrick Policy, in which the DOJ required prosecutors to request specific
jury instructions in prosecutions under the ESA. There, the DOJ had
internally disseminated the policy through a memorandum, which likely
made it easier for the court to infer a general policy from the pattern of
underenforcement.237
Rather than refuse to evaluate whether severe underenforcement is
occurring, courts should look beyond the fact that agencies are still partially
enforcing statutes or have not adopted a general enforcement policy. Instead,
courts must be more willing to infer a general policy amounting to abdication
from a pattern of severe underenforcement consisting of, for example,
235

See supra Section II.C.
This is superior to a solution that involves Congressional action. True, there are actions that
Congress could take, such as requiring agencies to publish when they adopt policies that amount to severe
underenforcement so that those policies could be reviewed. But this is an inferior option for three reasons.
First, it may violate the Constitution. If the statute curtailed Presidential oversight of how the laws are
executed, it could be infringing upon the President’s powers under the Take Care Clause. See generally
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J.
541 (1994) (arguing that the text of the Constitution supports a unitary Executive and that the President
must have stricter control over the Executive Branch). Second, it is pragmatically unlikely. It is hard to
imagine that Congress can overcome the inertia required to pass a statute that requires this of agencies,
especially when Congress may have little incentive to do so. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent,
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569,
592–94 (explaining Congressional inertia in passing statutes). Something that may hinder a President
whose party has a majority in Congress would likely not garner enough Congressional support. See Josh
Blackman, Gridlock, 130 HARV. L. REV. 241, 242–43 (2016). Third, publicizing enforcement policies
curtails enforcement’s deterrent strength. See Price, Politics, supra note 9, at 1138 (“[E]nforcement
transparency will often be counterproductive: the more public the nonenforcement policy, the stronger
the signal to regulated parties that they may organize their behavior around the enforcement policy rather
than the statute or regulation.”); see also supra note 176–84 and accompanying text.
237
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
236
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multiple or systematic agency refusals to enforce a provision or statute. This
ensures that agencies cannot severely underenforce a statute while escaping
judicial review under the APA. Because a policy that severely underenforces
a statute and qualifies for the abdication exception is likely to be arbitrary
and capricious,238 broadening the interpretation will result in review that acts
as a meaningful check.
Under this approach, the result in PETA239 may have differed. In that
case, the D.C. Circuit refused to find a general policy of nonenforcement
even though the agency itself had essentially admitted in multiple individual
responses that it refused to enforce the statute because it believed that the
agency had no jurisdiction.240 If the court had been willing to look more
closely at those representations and how the agency was enforcing the statute
overall, it may have found that the agency was consciously and expressly
underenforcing the statute to such a degree as to implicate the concerns
involved in severe underenforcement. In such a case, a court should find that
the claim qualifies for the abdication exception and is thus reviewable.
Adopting a severe underenforcement approach will not only alleviate
the pressing concerns previously outlined but will also provide incentives for
agencies to be more thoughtful in their enforcement. The availability of
judicial review (or lack thereof) impacts agency decisions.241 Knowing that
meaningful judicial review under the APA lurks around the corner might
increase the likelihood that decision-makers will adhere more closely to
legislative intent in enforcing statutes, whereas knowing that courts use the
total nonenforcement approach could have the opposite impact.242
To be sure, the severe underenforcement approach leads to more
potential review of agency action, and in general, courts would prefer to
defer to agencies. But this potential increase in opportunities for judicial
review should not be a huge concern. First, very few cases would even
qualify for the abdication exception, as evidenced by the low number of
cases that have arisen since Chaney that have even referenced the exception.
Those cases, however, present the dire concerns explored above, and thus
the need for potential review in those few cases would outweigh concerns
about allowing more review of agency action. And second, this approach
aligns with the APA because the discretion involved in severe
underenforcement exceeds the discretion contemplated by the APA’s
238
239

See supra notes 119 & 129.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S Dep’t of Agric., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C.

2013).
240
241
242

Id. at 12.
See Sunstein, supra note 25, at 656.
See id. at 656–57.
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exception from judicial review for agency action “committed to agency
discretion by law.”243 This therefore would not constitute an unmandated
extension of judicial review but one that fits within the structure of the APA,
as recognized by the Court in Chaney.244
A more pragmatic issue this approach may pose is manageability
concerns for courts. As previously noted, this Note defines severe
underenforcement as underenforcement so severe that it reaches the same
pragmatic result as total nonenforcement. Finding the line between
individual discretion and severe underenforcement can admittedly be
difficult. For instance, myriad reasons could potentially explain why the DOJ
failed to enforce the relevant provision of the ESA despite the high number
of Mexican wolf killings, such as a lack of resources or evidence. In those
cases, a kind of burden-shifting scheme might emerge: once the challenger
has shown that there has been severe underenforcement, like with the ESA’s
taking prohibition, the burden might shift to the defending agency to
demonstrate that it is applying discretion on a case-by-case basis rather than
consciously, expressly, and severely underenforcing the statute. In doing so,
courts may look at ongoing attempts at enforcement, such as whether the
incident was investigated, or require explanations from the defending
agencies. It is possible that a court may struggle with parsing through
complicated explanations. But this analysis is not too much to ask of courts
because this is the type of analysis that courts do daily, especially in the
administrative law context.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Chaney to render agency nonenforcement
presumptively unreviewable under the APA necessarily recognized the
importance of executive discretion in enforcing the laws. In doing so, it also
left the door open for agencies to categorically not enforce or severely
underenforce statutes and escape judicial review. But the Chaney Court also
established the abdication exception to prevent agencies from escaping
review under the APA. Courts and scholars, however, have consistently
interpreted the abdication exception as only encompassing total
nonenforcement or as requiring a general enforcement policy. Courts have
thus let potential agency abdication, in the form of severe underenforcement,
continue unchecked.
This poses two sets of serious concerns. The first involves how severe
underenforcement harms complex statutory schemes that have overlapping
243
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civil and criminal penalties and that heavily rely on federal enforcement. The
second involves how severe underenforcement potentially violates the
Constitution’s Presentment and Take Care Clauses and creates balance of
powers concerns. To alleviate these concerns, courts should interpret
Chaney’s abdication exception to encompass severe agency
underenforcement as well as total nonenforcement. Otherwise, there is no
effective way to review severe underenforcement under the APA to
determine whether it is arbitrary and capricious. Allowing review in these
situations would alleviate the pressing concerns that severe
underenforcement poses and would fully vindicate the judicial branch’s role,
as recognized in Chaney, of checking agency abdication.
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